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Symmetry and Asymmetry in Colonial 
Warrfarre ea. 1500-2000 
Tlhe Uses of a Concept 
by Dierk Waiter 
This article is concerned with the uses of the 
concept of asymmetric war for our 
understanding of colonial war, and the uses 
of studying colonial war for the further 
refinement of a concept of asymmetric war 
that shall enable us to make sense of some 
present developments in the history of 
warfare. 1 
What links the empirical phenomenon of 
colonial war to the theoretical conception of 
asymmetric war seems to be the way of 
waging war commonly known as small war. 
In the first of four parts of this paper I 
address the relationship between these three 
concepts- asymmetric war, colonial war, 
small war- and will discuss some concepts of 
definition. The key suggestion I submit in this 
part is that it is useful, especially in analyzing 
colonial warfare, to identify individual 
asvmmetries and symmetries in a given war, 
ra;her than label the whole war as either 
asymmetric or symmetric. 
In the second part of this paper I turn to 
the empirical application of this approach 
and explore some core asymmetries 
commonly found in colonial warfare. The 
third part emphasizes the somewhat 
paradoxical situation that from essentiallv 
asymmetric means in many cases an 
ultimately symmetric way of waging colonial 
war has emerged. The fourth and final part 
discusses, by way of a conclusion, the uses of 
an analysis of colonial wars along these lines 
for our study of the future of war. 
Asymmetric War, Small War, Colonial 
War 
Not all small wars are asymmetric wars, and 
not all asymmetric wars are fought as small 
wars, at least not for their entire duration. 
But in the vast majority of the cases in the 
history of warfare, both phenomena overlap 
in a way as to make them almost 
indistinguishable on the outside: small war-
the war of pinprick attacks against soft 
targets that shies away from pitched battle-
is the way in which asymmetric wars are 
fought. 2 
Very much the same relationship seems to 
exist between small wars and colonial wars. 
It is true that a choice did exist- the imperial 
power usually preferred to settle disputes in 
the conventional, European-style way, and if 
the indigenous opponent was fool enough to 
This article is based on a lecture given at the Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, on 7 Ocrober 2004. The lecture, in 
turn, was in several parts based on a paper presented to the conference The Transformation of Wlarfare that took place 
at the Hamburger Institut fiir Sozialforschung, Hamburg, Germany, 15 to 17 May 2003. A publication of the 
proceedings of this conference is forthcoming at the Hamburger Edition and will include a German version of this 
article. 
2 Chriscopher Daase, Klei11e Kriege- GroPe \\7irkrmg: Wic rmkml!'entionclle Kriegfiilmmg die intenwtio11alc l'olitik 
l'crJndert (Baden-Haden, 1999), esp. 97; Gil Mcrnm, How Democ.r,-rcies Lose Small \l?,trs: State, Societ)~ and the 
h1ilures of Fr.mce in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, tmd tbe U11ited States i11 Vietnam (Cambridge, 2003), 4. 
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oblige, a colonial war could be fought that 
way at least in its opening phase. 3 Yet the 
most promising option for indigenous 
political entities resisting imperial conquest 
was usually the guerrilla war or small war. In 
fact, for most of the nineteenth century at 
least in Britain "small wars" was an outright 
synonym for colonial wars.4 
While thus colonial wars are usually 
fought as small wars, small war has existed 
and continues to exist also in the realm of 
conventional, European-style warfare. 
However, here it is mostly confined to 
internal unrest or to resistance once 
occupation by a foreign power has been 
established by means of conventional war; or 
otherwise small war is a mere auxiliary to the 
war of conventional armies. In this sense, 
small war, kleiner Krieg, has been an integral, 
albeit usually inconspicuous, part of many 
campaigns fought among European states 
from the eighteenth century right to \Yorld 
War Two in Russia and the Balkans.0 These 
wars were also very rarely asymmetric, and 
thus they confirm the initial reservation. 
"Colonial war" seems to be an "I know it 
\Vhen I see it" case and hence a universally 
adopted definition is wanting. When 
analyzing colonial warfare most scholars 
concentrate on the classic cases, those being 
so obviously colonial wars that any attempt 
at defining the term seems patently pointless. 
The conquests of the Americas, of sub-
Saharan Africa, or of India are such examples 
of European or Europeanized powers waging 
wars of conquest against indigenous political 
entities in remote corners of the world.6 But 
what about wars at the colonial periphery 
where Europeans fought on both sides, with 
or maybe even without the support of 
indigenous allies? What, on the other hand, 
about wars in the colonies were no 
Europeans whatsoever where involved, 
except individually say as trainers, advisors, 
mercenaries? What about intra-European 
wars of conquest and colonization, like the 
one waged by Germany against the Soviet 
Union from 1941 to 1944? Any attempt to 
talk about colonial wars without at least a 
working definition, any attempt to fall back 
on a truism like "colonial war is the war in 
the colonies", any attempt to substitute for 
instance "overseas war" or any other 
meaningless term for "colonial war" leaves 
these perfectly legitimate questions 
unanswered and clouds the debate? 
Additionally, Hwar"- in itself a term that 
still lacks a universally accepted definition -
leaves a lot to be desired as a description of 
most of the politically inspired violence at the 
.J For stylistic convenience, i.e. to avoid monotony, this article uses a variety of terms such as imperial pmvcr, colonial 
power, colonizing power, European (great) power, power (or state) of rhe Northern hemisphere, etc., more or less as 
synonyms. Unless a specific n1eaning is evident from the context, all these terms im·ariably denote the "strong" actor in 
a situation of imperial domination, the one who uses political means to enforce the integration of new regions on rhe 
periphery into an expanding economic system that he controls, as described by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson 
(sec note 1 0). By the same token, the somewhat clumsy, albeit useful term "indigenous political entity", denoting the 
"weak" actor in an imperial rdation:.hip, is occasionally substituted, for stylistic reasons, by broad generalizations such 
as "the colonized". While these rather general terms may not in every single case do justice tO the actual political or 
constitutional situation on rhc spot, more precision is nt:ithl'r required nor even usdul for an analysis of the use of force 
in colonial contexts over the centuries, as attempted in this article. 
4 C. E. Call well, Small W1ars: Their PrincifJles and Practice (London, 1906/1976 ). 
5 Johanncs Kunisch, Dcr K/ei11e Krieg: Studien Zlllll Heerwesen des Absolutislmts (Wiesbaden, 1973 ); Her fried .MUnklcr, 
"Die Gestalt des Partisanen. Herkunft und Zukunft", in .MUnkler {ed.}, Der Partisa11: Thcorie, Str.:1tegie, Gestalt 
(Opladcn. 1990)14-39. 
6 "'Europeanized" powers arc rhosc descendants of the European-controllcd world system at the colonial periphery 
which, in rhcir own relationship with indigenous political entities, act more or less like Europe.1n powers. This is true, 
above all, for the United Sratt:s of America, but likewise for all other colonies of European settlement, once thev become 
independent political actors, such as Canada, South Africa, Australia or New Zealand after they achieved do~1inion 
status. The modern state of Israel is another example of such a "Europeanized" st;1tc. To avoid the monotonous 
repetition '"European and Europeanized" as far as possible, in this article "European" alone will usually be used to 
cover both these groups of "'strong" actors. 
7 H. L. Wesseling, "Colunial \'\1ars: an Introduction", in J. A. De lvloor/Wesseling (eds.), Imperialism and \\'lar: Essays on 
Colonial Wars in Asi.1 and Africa (leiden, 1989), 2; Erwin A. Schmidl, ''Koloni.'llkriege: Zwischen groGem Krieg und 
kleincm Friedcn", in Manfried Rauchensrciner/Schmidl (cd~.). Formen des Krieges: Vom Mittel.iltcr :::wn "Low-
Intensity-Conflict" (Graz, 1991), 111-2. 
colonial periphery.8 As a social phenomenon 
of limited duration, with a clearly defined 
beginning and a likewise clearly defined end 
and distinct from a complementary 
phenomenon usually referred to as "peace", 
war does not exist in the history of European 
rule over indigenous populations at the 
colonial periphery. Colonial rule as such was 
at all times a function of structural violence 
and the threat as well as actual application of 
physical violence both on the individual and 
the collective level. Only the scope and 
intensity of such violence were variable.9 
Occasionally, it culminated in that form of 
organized collective violence that fits the 
Clausewitzian concept of "war". Any 
definition of colonial war that concentrates 
only on these tips of the iceberg would 
neglect the iceberg itself and thus fail to take 
the nature of colonial rule into account. 
Hence, in my considered opinion, if the 
term "colonial war" is to serve any heuristic 
purpose, it should be described as the actual 
application of physical violence- regardless 
of the intensity and scope- in the context of 
that structural phenomenon that historians 
and social scientists have labelled, with 
varying actual definitions, as "imperialism" 
or without the ideological connotation, as 
"European expansion". In line with the 
influential contribution of Ronald Robinson 
and John Gallagher, "The Imperialism of 
Free Trade" (1953),10 I would like to 
describe imperialism as the political function 
of the integration of new regions into an 
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expanding economic system. This way, we 
have a working definition that is wide 
enough to cover all actual manifestations of 
European expansion over the centuries 
without being burdened with the arbitrary 
restrictions of many other definitions. In this 
sense, to sum up, "'colonial war" would be 
that part of this political function that 
consists of the actual application of physical 
violence. (Admittedly, under this assumption 
the term "imperial war" or "war of 
imperialism" would probably be more 
appropriate, but it is not as commonly used a 
term as "colonial war" and also somewhat 
prone to misunderstandings.) 
Under this perspective colonial wars, 
paradoxical as it may sound, have not ceased 
to exist with decolonisation. Understood 
correctly, Robinson's and Gallagher's theory 
can easily be extrapolated into the twentieth 
century and applied to what happened after 
the establishment of formal rule. It then 
becomes obvious tbat the transfer of power 
to indigenous elites during decolonisation is, 
in analytic terms, equivalent with the 
reinstatement of collaboration regimes -
regimes whose breakdown in the nineteenth 
century had necessitated replacing informal 
predominance through costly formal rule in 
the first place.11 Thus, decolonisarion is 
nothing more tban the return to the normal 
state of affairs at the colonial periphery, to 
the dominant reality of imperialism for 
centuries. 12 The wars that states of the 
Northern Hemisphere waged and continue to 
8 In spire of its political and criminological rather than historical character, the ongoing debate on whether terrorism can 
be usefully described as war is not without interest. From a historical perspective, the similarities and grey areas are 
obvious enough to make an analysis of politically motivated, organized terror within the parameters of (small) war 
<lppcar both appropriate and productive. In this respect, the inspiring contribution by Her fried MU.nklcr, "Gucrillakrieg 
und Tcrrorismus", in Neue Politiscbc Litl!ratllr 25 (1980), 299-326, is still relevant. At the conference 
'·KriegsbcgrUndungcn., (normative justifications of war) in Berlin (30 to 31 January 2004 }, the former SPD politician 
Erh.1rd Epplcr has recently argued that calling terrorism war is tantamount to needlessly making combatants our of 
terrorists. Obviously, this is a purely political line of thought with little historical relevance. 
9 Even though one does nor necessarily have to agree with the broad gencrnlizarions and sweeping accusations against 
colonial rule as such, Trutz von Trotha, Koloniale Herrscha/t: Zur soziologisd;en Theorie der Staatsentstelmng am 
Beispid des "',)'cimtzgehictes To go" (Tiibingen, 1994 ), esp. 32-84; and Trotha, "'The Fellows Can Just Stan·e': On \\lars 
of 'Pacification' in the African Colonies of' Imperial Germany and the Concept of 'Total War"', in Nlanfred E Boemekc/ 
Roger Chickering/Srig Fi,irster (cds.), Anticipating Total W"ar: The German and American bcperiences, 1871-1914 
{Cambridge, 1999), 420-30, arc valuable. On everyday violence on the frontier see for instance Urs Bitterli, Die 
"'Wilden" .tmd die "Zivilisierten": Grtmd::iige einer Geistes- tmd Kttltttrgescbicbte der europiiisch-iiberseeischen 
Begegmmg, 2nd cd. (MUncbcn, 1991 ), 142-4; Richard Broome, A.borigimzl Australians: Black Responses to \Vbite 
Dominance 1788-19lJ4, 2nd ed. (St. Lconards, NSW, 1994 ), esp. 39-44; also Schmidl, "Kolonialkriege", 116-7. 
10 John Gallaght:"r/Ronald Rubinson, "'The lmpcrialism of Free Trade", in The Eamomic History Reuiew 6 (1953-4), 1-
15. 
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wage in the Third World during and after 
decolonisation still follow the patterns 
established in earlier colonial wars, even 
though the actual war aims may have shifted. 
They are still being fought to establish or 
uphold the integration of the periphery in the 
Western style world system- that conclusion 
is really a simple enough consequence of the 
analytic tool provided by Robinson and 
Gallagher and does not need the politically 
instrumentalized theories of neo-colonialism 
and dependency. 
So, coming back to the beginning, we have 
established that small wars are normally 
asymmetric, and that colonial wars are, as a 
rule waged as small wars. Does that mean 
that colonial wars are usually asymmetric 
wars? Formal logic says they are, and 
historical evidence supports the logic. The 
very essence of imperialism is the 
establishment and upholding of an 
asymmetric, unequal relationship between 
the imperial power and the political entities 
on the colonial periphery. Diplomatically, 
politically, economically, culturally, 
technically, and scientifically, the colonizing 
power enjoys all the advantages the 
Europeanized world system has to offer, 
while the colonized are burdened with all the 
disadvantages. That may sound like an over-
simplification and in some cases, upon closer 
scrutiny, it certainly is. But by and large, the 
world system as it has emerged over the five 
centuries that have passed since the conquest 
of the Americas has been deliberately 
constructed to ensure that the European and 
Europeanized powers enjoyed precisely those 
advantages described above vis-a-vis the 
indigenous political entities they had set out 
to dominate. 
The system of international politics and 
international law that was the core of the 
European-style world system reserved all the 
rights of free and independent actors to the 
European states while indigenous political 
entities were marginalized, in the worst case 
even dismissed as non-existent. In any case, 
the system of imperial rule monopolized the 
external political contacts of the colonized so 
that their political organizations became 
dependent actors. Unequal economic 
relations were the very raison d'etre of the 
imperial system; the economies on the 
colonial periphery were (re)constructed in a 
way that made them complementary to the 
metropolitan economies, usually by turning 
them into market-oriented producers of cash 
crops and raw materials while restricting 
their own industrial development. The 
political and economic domination of the 
imperial powers was aided, in many sense 
brought about in the first place, by their 
superior military and civil technology, the 
bureaucratic organization of their 
administrative systems, and their superior 
knowledge of the world on all relevant 
fields. 13 
Being, as stated earlier, the application of 
physical violence as part of the political 
function of domination at the colonial 
11 Ronald Robinson, "Tbe Excentric Idea of Imperialism, witl1or without Empire", in Wolfgangj . .:Vlommscn/jUrgen 
Osrcrbammel (eds.), Imperialism and After: Ccmtumities a11d Discontinuities (London, 1986), 267-89; Robinson, 
"'Nun-Europcan foundations of European imperialism: skcrch for a theory of collaboration", in Roger Owen/Bob 
Sutdiffe {cds.), Studies in the theor-y of imperi.-1/ism (London, 1972), 118~0. 
11 This rather obvious conclusion- only implied by Robinson- has not yet been generally accepted in intcrprcrations of 
the decolonization era. Cf., however, Tony Smith, The Pattcm of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, .wd the 
/.1te-industrializing world since 1815 (Cambridge, 19S 1), 85; Wo!fg;mg J. Mommsen, "The End of Empire and rhc 
Continuity of Imperialism", in Mommsen/Osterhammd, Imperialism and Ajler, 3.33-58. On the continuity of aims 
(before and after decolonizarion) sec also Phillip Darby, Three Faces of lmperiJ!is111: British and Anlt!rican Appro.1cbes 
to Asia and Africa 1870-1970 (New Haven, Cf, 1987), 213-4. In this light, it is difficult to agree with Schmidl's 
suggestion ("Kolonialkriege"', 121) that the middle of the twentieth century should mark "the transition from colonial 
conflicts to Third World conflicts" (my tmnsliltion), especially since the diffcrcnrarion between both terms is merely 
implied rather than spelled out. 
13 For introductions to the character of European imperialism/expansion and the Europcan-centcred world system see 
Jiirgen Osterhammcl, Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folge11 (,Miinchen, 1995), and Wolfgang Rcinhard, 
Gcschichte der emopdiscben Expansion, 4 vols. (Stuttg;ut, 1983-90}; for a very brief overview, see my own ankle 
"Colonialism & Imperialism", in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peaci!, and Conflict, ed. Lesrcr Kurrz er al. (San Diego, CA, 
19991, U55-65. 
periphery, colonial wars are therefore most 
obviously wars between actors that are 
defined by their asymmetric relationship and 
rhe difference in the means they have at their 
disposal. However, asymmetry is not to be 
confused with unequal strength. In many 
cases an apparent strength can become a 
weakness and apparent weakness can be 
capitalized upon and turned into a strength. 
Asymmetry, therefore, means in rhe first 
place different quality, not necessarily also 
different quantity; and asymmetric war 
signifies nor primarily the war between 
strong and weak, but a war in which the 
opponents are of a different kind and use 
different ways to achieve their aims. 
Asymmetric war, however, is not yet a 
fully developed analytical category - a 
historical concept clearly enough defined and 
sufficiently discussed to really further our 
understanding of violent conflict. At this 
time, "asymmetric war" is just another 
catch phrase describing the "other" structure 
of armed conflict- the non-Clausewirzian, 
non-European, non-state conflict pattern-
rhat occupies the place of many other such 
categories that have come and gone over the 
last two centuries. The probably earliest 
concept was thar of "small war" (Kleiner 
Kl"ieg, la petite guerre) that was common in 
the eighteenth century. 14 After 1800 
"partisan war" -German Partisanenkrieg or 
ParteigJuff'·krieg- became the prevalent 
category. 0 Its contemporary twin, guerrilla, 
achieved notoriety only after World War 
Two, at a time when political debates also 
frequently blurred the distinction between 
means and aims of war by talking of 
14 Kunisch, Der Klcinv Krieg. 
15 Niiinkler, Partisan. 
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'"revolutionarY war" or "anti-colonial war" 
as if they wer~ analytic categories. 16 The 
following decades were blessed with the 
frequent introduction of new terms to 
describe the familiar phenomenon: 
"Insurgency" (and "counter-insurgency") 17, 
the still pofular concept of "low-intensity 
conflict", 1 and the US military contributed 
the expression "operations other than war'', 
or OOTW, 19 that with its own charming 
logic defies translation into other languages 
(at least translation into German). The most 
recent offspring of this two-century old 
family is IIOW "asymmetric Warn, a term that 
is fast becoming commonplace even iu the 
newspapers. 
In spite of the term's frequent use, a 
concise and widely accepted definition of 
asymmetric war- at least one that would go 
beyond stating the obvious- is still wanting. 
The superficial simplicity of the concept may 
be largely responsible for that.20 Like 
OOTW, asymmetric war is ultimately 
defined through its opposite, symmetric war. 
Asymmetric war is the war that does not fit 
into the normative concept of the war 
between actors of maybe not equal strength, 
but of equal right- it is not the war between 
sovereign nation states in the European sense. 
Any war in which even one side is not a 
universally recognized state actor with a 
regular army is by default asymmetric war, so 
that a definition seems to be quite pointless. 
Just like in the case of colonial war, 
asymmetric war seems to go by the logic of"] 
know it when I see it", or rather, "I know it 
when I don't see its opposite". 
16 A typical example is Mao Tsc*tung, Theorie des Gucrillakrieges oder Strategic der Dritte11 Wdt (Rcinbek bci Hamburg, 
1966}, esp. the introduction hy Sebastian Haffner. 
17 Ian F. W. Bcckett, Modem Insurgencies ,md Coumer-lnsmgeucies: Guerillas and their Opponents since 1750 (London, 
2001). 
18 ivlartin van Creveld, The Tmns{ormatiou of \V'ar (New York, 1991 ). Cf. Daase, Kleine Kriege, 136-46; Manfricd 
Rauchensteiner, "An dcr S.:hwdlc zum Kricg- hisrorischc Dimension en des 'Low Intensity Conflict"', in 
Rauchcnsteiner/Schmidl, Formen des Krieges, 177-205. 
19 Bcckett, Insurgencies, S. 204-5. 
20 Andrcas Hcrhcrg-Rothc, Dcr Krieg: Gcscbichte rmd Gege11wart (Frankfurr/Main, 2003), 152:" ... bcidc Gegncr !rind 
miliriirisch in hi:iclmem MaGc ungleich" ("both opponents arc militarily extremely unequal"); I-lerfricd ivlUnklcr, Die 
ueuen Kriege (Reinbck bci Hamburg, 2002), 11: " ... in dcr Rcgel nicht glcich:urige Gegncr" ("opponents that arc, as a 
rule, not of rhc same kind"). 
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It was my private con cl us ion from a 
conference under the title of The 
Transformation of Warfare that took place in 
Hamburg, Germany, in May 2003 as part of 
a series on The Future of War that a single 
category like asymmetric war is of very 
limited analytic use. If our idea of symmetric 
war is quite narrow and well-defined- which 
is the case -then the notion that all other 
forms of violent conflict are asymmetric wars 
is tautological and in its vague generality 
really next to useless. A catch-all phrase like 
asymmetric war covers conflict patterns so 
diverse that a closer- much closer- look is 
definitely worth our time. 
As will become evident below, even in a 
non-European, non-Ciausewitzian, non-
state-actor conflict, asymmetric structures 
can be found in quite different actual 
manifestations and can be joined or even 
replaced temporarily or permanently by 
completely symmetric elements. In a 
significant number of individual cases of such 
wars, this mix of factors is confusing enough 
to make the applicability of the label 
~'asymmetric war" quite questionable. 
Therefore, I consider it prudent not to limit 
ourselves to the comparatively banal 
question, is a given war symmetric or 
asymmetric- unsurprisingly, the possible 
answers are '~yes", ''no", or ''I can't say". An 
infinitely more helpful approach would be to 
ask what kind of asymmetries -and of 
symmetries- can be found in a given conflict, 
to which extent they govern its course and 
conduct, and how they interact with one 
another. Admittedly this does not make for a 
neat model of dichotomic ideal types of the 
sort so favoured by political scientists. It 
does, however, lead ro much more precise 
answers, not the least under a comparative 
svnthetic approach. It is then possible to ask, 
f~r instance, if and under what circumstances 
inequality of military strength favours 
asymmetric means of conflict resolution-
wi1ich is in no way always self-evident. 
Under this approach, especially by way of 
comparison, it is also possible to make sense 
21 DJnse, Kleine Kriege, esp. 90-105. 
of the otherwise quite confusing 
circumstance that asymmetric structures are 
also found in wars between European nation 
states with a roughly comparable military 
potential- say for instance such elements as 
the dehumanization of the enemy and the 
almost complete dissolution of th.e ius in bello 
in the German-Soviet War of 1941 to 1944, 
or say, generally, the many instances of 
partisan warfare within the European 
interstate wars not only in the twentieth 
century. Should we describe these conflicts as 
symmetric wars, asymmetric wars, or some 
sort of neither-nor? A short-sighted question, 
I submit. Only by breaking down these wars 
into their constituent parts and analyzing 
them step-by-step can we hope to cope with 
their otherwise hopelessly contradictory 
nature. World War Two in the East 
combined a majority of symmetric and a 
significant minority of asymmetric elements. 
These elements transpired partly 
simultaneously, partly in succession, and 
sometimes only in specific regions, and they 
can be and should be analyzed individually, 
in their interaction with each other, and in 
their interdependence with geography, the 
military course of the campaign, the 
ideological confrontation, customs and 
traditions of warfare on both sides, and so 
on, and be compared under all these aspects 
with other conflicts. This way- this way only 
-the concepts of symmetry and asymmetry 
are suddenly extremely useful as heuristic 
tools. Compared with this approach, 
labelling a whole war as either symmetric or 
asymmetric is banal and pointless. 
And still, there is one exception to that 
verdict that I would like to make. One of the 
rare, more specific models of asymmetric 
war, that developed by Christopher Daase in 
his "Kieine Kriege- Grolle Wirkung" is 
extraordinarily helpful in at least one respect. 
For Daase, asymmetric war is war that 
transforms the internal structure and the 
legitimacy of its actors, which in symmetric 
war remain basically unchanged and 
stable.21 This notion is significant for the 
study of colonial wars because colonial wars 
can also be understood and described, 
borrowing a paradigm that has originally 
been coined to describe early modern 
conflicts, as state building wars.22 That is of 
course perfectly evident for wars of colonial 
occupation. It is a lot less obvious, bur no less 
interesting, for wars of pacification on the 
colonial periphery.23 It is, finally, equally 
true and not quite as banal as it looks for 
colonial wars of independence. Protracted 
wars of liberation massively transform the 
social and political organization of their 
acrors.24 The political system and the 
everyday politics of many Third World states 
that emerged after 1945 still bear witness of 
the heritage of the wars these states had to 
fight to achieve their independence.25 Even 
decades later, the political discourse in many 
a former colony is dominated throughout by 
recourse to the mechanisms, techniques, 
patterns of behaviour, and strategies of 
legitimization that were first successfully 
tested and applied in the armed conflicts 
fought during decolonization.26 
Obviously, the consequences of 
asymmetric war at the colonial periphery, 
under the Daase model, are in no way as 
drastic for the "'strong" actor, the imperial 
power (we will come back tO this particular 
circumstance later). In many a sense, 
therefore, the ''meta-asymmetry'' of colonial 
war lies therein: what makes colonial war 
asymmetric in the sense described by 
Christopher Daase, the transformation of its 
actors by the conduct of the war, applies 
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primarily, sometimes exclusively, to the 
"weak" side.27 
Asymmetries in Colonial Warfare 
AsymmetJ}' of Means 
One of the most familiar features of our 
image of colonial warfare, especially in the 
nineteemh and early twentieth century, is the 
striking asymmetry between the means the 
imperial power and the means the indigenous 
opponents had at their disposal. Colonial 
wars are invariably pictured as the clash of 
cannon and musket versus spear, later of 
Maxim gun and repeater versus flintlock 
musket, and in the latest stages of aircraft and 
armour versus, at best, submachine gun. It is 
worth remembering, though, that in earlier 
centuries the purely technical military means 
of the colonizing powers were by no means as 
dramatically superior to those available to 
their indigenous opponents as this image 
suggests. Firearms may have impressed native 
Americans and occasionally scared Africans 
into submission, but were, for instance, 
perfectly well known in many parts of Asia 
already in the sixteenth century. 
Accordingly, European powers enjoyed no 
in-built technological advantage whatsoever 
in land combat, say, in India in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.28 The 
picture is a bit different when taking naval 
warfare into account. There, the European 
maritime powers by necessity had developed 
alreadv in the sixteenth centurv all the assets 
that e~entually established their world-wide 
22 Juhanncs Burkhardc, Der Drcij;igiiihrige Kricg (Frankfurc/Main, 1991). 
23 For some typical examples sec Lonsdalc, "The Conquest Stare of Kenya", in De Moor/\X'esscling, Imperialism .md \'(l11r, 
87-120. 
24 Daase, Kleine Kriegc, esp. 216-35. 
25 This is probably most striking in the cases of Algeria and Palestine, or, to take a much more recent example, of 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, where the fronclincs of rhe independence wars appear to be far from being overcome any time 
~non. 
26 For rhe "cult of violence" in African politics of rhe posr-decolonizarion era sec Bruce Vandervorr, W'ars of lmfJeriul 
Conq11est in Africa 1830-1914 (Bioomington, IN, 1998 ), 217-19. 
27 Obvious examples to the contrary, like Indochina and Algeria, make it appear plausible that serious repercussions for 
thl' metropolitan society arc to be expected only if (a) the mobilization of manpower and (b) the own casualties arc on a 
~ea le chat was rather unusual, for colonial wars, before the middle of the twentieth century, and if (c) the colonial war is 
merely a cat:dysr for exi.<>ting massive socio-political conflicts in the mother country. For Vietnam sec the forthcoming 
srudy hy lkrnd Gn:incr, Das mncrikanischc jahrlmndert: Krieg und zit,ilgcsellschd{t in den USA, vol. 3 (Hamburg); for 
Algeria Alisrair Hornc, A S,wage \\'l,;1r of Peace: Algeria 19S4-1962, rev. ed. {London,2001). 
28 D. H. A. Kolff, "The End of an Ancien Rigime: Colonial War in India, 1798-1818", in De Moor/\Vcsseling, 
Imperialism and \\'far, 33. 
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dominance of the seas, while outside Europe 
even great powers like China and Mughal 
India had failed to build bluewater navies of 
any significance.29 
As far as land warfare is concerned, 
however, the technological lead enjoyed by 
the colonizing powers emerged gradually 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and peaked between 1890 and 
1940 with the introduction of machine guns, 
armoured vehicles, aircraft, 30 not to forget 
communication technologies like telegraph, 
telephone, wireless and the great force-
multipliers of colonial campaigning, 
steamships and rail roads. Then after World 
War Two the European advantage slowly 
receded, when it became obvious that the 
weapons of mass warfare and mass 
destruction that theoretically constituted the 
last decided technological edge the great 
powers had on any colonial opponent had no 
immediate significance in actual campaigns 
in the Third World. At the same time, the 
moderately sophisticated weaponry of the 
twentieth century- submachine guns, 
mortars, even rocket launchers- became 
widely available to colonial liberation 
movements, albeit often only by means of 
being provided by the leading powe; of the 
opposing bloc in the Cold War era.·' 1 
Apart from technology, but closely related 
to it, one of the most striking advantages 
Europeans enjoyed in colonial warfare at 
least from the eighteenth century onwards 
was the rational, bureaucratic principles on 
which their administrative and military 
organization was based. Most indigenous 
opponents' will tO fight could always be 
severely shaken and more often than not 
outright terminated by the death of their 
leader. The same was not true for the 
European side, where the incapacitation or 
death even of an overall commander simply 
meant that the immediate subordinate took 
his place. European forces were thus much 
more resistant against the form of sudden 
breakdown of morale that regularly befell 
indigenous armies in case of a reversal and 
often ended in complete dissolution. On a less 
dramatic level, European-style bureaucracy 
enabled the armies of the colonizing powers 
to take the field more regularly, to hold it for 
longer periods of time, to maximize whatever 
technological and logistic advantages they 
enjoyed, in short, to multiply their numbers 
by means of superior organization.32 
The indigenous opponent invariably 
compensated for his technological and 
organizational inferiority with a dramatic 
numerical superiority.33 That was of course a 
simple result of the fact that the efforts 
devoted to overseas warfare by colonizing 
powers by nature had to remain extremely 
limited. For one thing, the technical means of 
power projection in remote, especially 
overseas areas, were quite poor in pre-
modern times. Shipping an army even some 
thousand strong to a remote coast, let alone 
maintaining it for any length of time, was a 
considerable logistic challenge in the age of 
sail. 34 For another thing, the cost of 
maintaining large overseas garrisons would 
have been prohibitive and any attempt to do 
so would have been directly contrary to the 
very end of colonial rule, that is, financial 
gain. Accordingly, until well into the heyday 
29 D. H. A. Kolff, "The End of an A11cit>n Rdgime: Colonial \X'ar in India, 1798-1818 ", in De ~'loor/Wesseling, 
lmp(!rialism and War, 33. 
30 Gcoffrcy Parker, "Ships of the Line 1500-1650", in Parker {eJ.), The Cmthridge Illustrated History of \1/arfare: The 
Triumph of tbt! West (Cambridge, 1995}, ll0-31; Reinhard, Expmtsio11, vol. 1, Die alte \¥/eft bis 1818 (Stuttgart, 
!983), 28-61. 
31 On the Europeans' technological edge over the non-Europcan world see generally William H.1vlcNcill, "European 
Expansion, PO\vcr and Warfare since 1500", in De Moor/W'csscling, Imperialism and \Vat; 12-21; Daniel R. Hcadrick, 
"The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century", 
in jounwl of A-Jodem History 51 (1979), 231-63; Hew Strachan, European Armies a11d the Conduct of \\'lar (London, 
1983 ), 82-3; Lawrence jamcs, The Sa1'11ge \V<~rs: British Campaigns in Africa, 1870-1920 (Nc\v York, 1985), 260-79; 
Robert Kubicck, "British Expansion, Empire, and Technological Change"', in Andrcw Jlortcr/Aiaine Low {cds.), The 
Ox(."Jrd History of the British Empire, vol. 3, The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1 999), 247-69. 
32 Callwcll, Snw/1 Wars, 76-7, 90; Ostcrhammel, Kolonialismus, 52; We-sscling, "Colonial \Vars", 6. 
33 L. H. Gann/Petcr Duignan, The Rulers of British Africa 1870-1914 (London, 1978), 138-9. 
34 Jercmy Black, btropemt \'f/arfare 1660-1815 (London, 1994), 208. 
of Europe's colonial empires in the early 
twentieth century, permanent colonial 
garrisons of merropolitan troops remained 
insignificant in size.35 Before the arrival of air 
transport, however- which did not become a 
means of transferring large contingents of 
ground troops, let alone heavy equipment, 
for many more decades36 - it was manifestly 
impossible to rapidly reinforce overseas 
garrisons in case of an emergency. Hence the 
only two means by which an imperial power 
could substitute for its usually massive 
numerical inferiority was technology on the 
one hand- and indigenous manpower on the 
other. 
Colonial warfare has always, to a large 
degree, and even more so in heavily 
populated areas, relied on indigenous 
mercenaries, levies, auxiliary troops, or allies. 
Indigenous manpower was available in large 
quantities, easily raised and likewise easily 
disposed of, cheap, and significantly less 
susceptible to tropical diseases than 
European troops. In fact, the ultimate means 
by which tiny European garrisons could 
uphold European rule over vast indigenous 
popularions was not technology, bur the 
cunning exploitation of existing or newly 
created rivalries between the colonized 
themselves. In early modern times, the 
colonizing power usually availed itself of this 
manpower potential by means of temporary 
alliances. Later, and increasingly from the 
nineteenth century on, the forming of 
permanent colonial forces based on local 
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levies became the means of choice. Until the 
middle of the twentieth century, the largest 
colonial standing army was without 
comparison the British Indian Army, 
regularly well over 150 000 strong in 
peacetime and expandable to several million 
in war, with the bulk of the rank and file 
being of course native Indians. It by far 
outdid the metropolitan standing army in 
size; a fact, though, that fails to take into 
account that metropolitan Britain 
maintained, in peacetime, the most powerful 
standing navy in the world, thus providing 
the ultimate means by which the Empire was 
controlled. 37 
Nevertheless, even counting colonial 
manpower, over the course of the five 
centuries of European expansion there was 
almost always a grave disparity in the 
numerical size of the armed forces on both 
sides in any colonial conflict. It approached 
the ridiculous in the earliest centuries of 
European expansion when a handful of 
poorly armed Spanish adventurers, albeit 
with the help of European diseases, toppled 
the vasr Aztec and Inka empires, and was still 
bordering on the incredible in the seventeenth 
and even eighteenth centuries as a few 
hundred European regulars repeatedly 
outfought indigenous armies that reportedly 
numbered in the tens or hundreds of 
thousands. 38 Of course, in many such 
insrances existing rifts among the opposing 
forces as well as indigenous allies of the 
colonizing power are discounted in the 
35 David Killingray, "'Guardians of Empire", in Killingray/David Omissi (eds.), Guardia11s of Empire: The Armed Forces 
a{ the ColoHiall'owers c. 1700-1904 (Manchester, 1999), 5-8. In 1930, with the British Empire spanning one-fourth of 
the globe's surface, there was not a single British (i.e. metropolitan) batralion in all of British Africa south of the Sahara. 
Ibid., 8. See also Gann/Duignan, Rulers of British Africa, 73, 84; Vandervort, \\i'ars, 37-40. 
36 For the mid-twentieth century, see William P. Snyder, The Politics of British /Jcfensc Policy, 1945-1961 (Columbus, 
OH, 1964), 10-15; H. C. G. Carnvright-Taylor, "Organization and Training for Air Transported Operations", in The 
Royal Engineers .fourn<i/76 ( 1962), 194-203. 
37 Killingray, "Guardians", 2-16; Killingray, "The Idea of a British Imperial African Army", in journal of African History 
20 (1979), 421-36; Gnnn/Duignan, Rulers of British A{rica, 71-89; Osterhammd, Kolonialismus, 51-4; Beckett, 
Inmrgeucies, 34; T. R. Morcman, '"Small Wars' and 'Imperial Policing': The British Army and the Theory nnd Practice 
of Colonial Warfare in the British Empire, 1919-1939"', in journal of Strategic Studies 19 (1996), 1 J 1-2; T. A. 
Hearhcore, "The Army of British India", in David Chandlerlbn lleckett (eds.), The Oxford Illustr.aed History o/thc 
British Army (Oxford, J 994), 376-401; Roberc Holland, ''The British Empire and the Great War, 1914-1918", in 
Judith M. H~own/\Vm. Roger Louis/Alaine Low (eds.), The Ox{ord History of the British Empire, vol. 4, The Ttl'f!lttieth 
·Ce~ttury• (Oxford, 1999), 121-23. 
38 For some drastic examples from Africa see David Killingray, "Colonial Wnrfarc in West Africa I 870-L914 ", in De 
!vloor/\V'essding, Imperialism and W'ar, 147, and Gann/Duignan, Rulers of British A{riw, 138. In the Battle of 
Omdurman, on 1 September 1898, rhe Nlahdi's Dervishes lost 27 000 men, including 11 000 killed; their Anglo-
Egyptian adversaries suffered less than 400 casualties, only 48 of which were faralitics.james, Samge \'\1urs, 106-8. 
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popular narrative, and equally often the very 
size of the enemy army is vastly 
exaggerated.39 Nevertheless, until well into 
the twentieth century superior technology, 
tactics and organization provided the 
European powers with the means to 
overcome far larger numbers of Third World 
opponents- if and as long as those opponents 
complied more or less with the conventional 
ways of waging war. 
It was the application of European 
technology, European ways of rational 
organization, and not least European theories 
of small war, bur also the forming of trans-
ethnic national resistance movements in the 
wars of decolonization after 1945, that 
finally necessitated the use of mass armies in 
the colonies.40 These armies also more often 
than not were now composed of national 
servicemen of the metropolitan country, as in 
the face of indigenous nationalist movements 
colonial manpower was no longer considered 
completely reliable.41 Charged with the 
suppression of entire hostile populations, 
however, even these mass armies found the 
job to be beyond their means at least in the 
long run. 
A;ymmetl)' of Knowledge 
Closely related to the technological 
advantages the imperial powers enjoyed uis-
a-vis their indigenous opponents was their 
vastly superior knowledge of the world as 
such. In early times, the Europeans' lead in 
this field was overwhelming. After the "re-
discovery" of America and the 
circumnavigation of the world, the Western 
civilization was the only one whose 
geographical image of the world 
encompassed all continents save Antarctica, 
the existence of which, if not its actual size 
and shape, was however known. Not even 
the Oriental civilizations, whose knowledge 
was for centuries limited to the "old" world, 
could compare with thar.42 
Superior knowledge of the wider world 
gave the colonial powers a decided edge over 
their indigenous opponents. It allowed them 
to develop global, rather than local, strategies 
for dealing with local crises, and ro refine 
systems of colonial rule and colonial warfare 
that were applicable to different 
circumstances and provided ready-made 
answers to many situations in advance. When 
the Europeans came to Africa in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, they carried 
with them not only trading goods and 
firearms, but also the accumulated 
39 Some interesting qualifications in this respect were offered by Erik Lund on 21 January 2004 on the H-War discussion 
I is t, h rrp:/ /h- net. msu.cd ulcgi- bin/Iogb rowse, pI? rrx=vx& I i st=H-
\X'ar&month=0401&wcck=c&msg=hxpDjzCZSwc7VzYnOHHWDQ&uscr=&pw= {13 May 2005). The tendency to 
exnggenne rhe enemy's numbers was even greater in the (rare) instance of a defeat, like in the Maori wars in New 
Zealand: James Bclich, The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflir:.t: The Alaori, the British, a11d the Neur Zealand 
Wars (h-lontreal, 1989}, 314. 
40 Even leaving aside the rather atypical Boer \'i/ar, it is true that armies deployed for wars on the colonial frontier started 
to grow significantly already from the beginning of the twentieth century (Vandervort, \\Tars, 185-6). However, not 
until the 1940s did mobilisation for colonial wars increase to a scale roughly cum parable to major European wars. The 
Soviet Union sent 642 000 men into Afghanistan; the highest level at any one time was 120 000 in 1986 (with 30 000 
more operating from Soviet territory: Beckett, Insurgencies, 211 ). Two point five million Americans served in Vietnam 
(John M. Carroll, .. America in Vietnam", in Carroli/Colin F. Baxter {eds.), The American A1ilitary Tradition: From 
Colonial Times to the Prese11t {Wilmingron, DE, 1993), 211 ), \Vith a force level of 500 000 at the end of the 1960s 
(~:l;m: Frey, Geschichte des Vietnamkrieges: Die TmgOdie iu Asien tmd d .. ts Ende des amerikanisclmt Traumes, 2nd ed. 
{l'VlUnchen, 1999), 188). In the summer of 1957, France had nearly 400 000 men in Algeria (Hnrtmut Elsenhans, 
Fmnkreicbs Algerie11krieg 1954-1962: Entkolonisienmgsuersuch einer kapitalistischen A'fetropole. Ztmt 
Zusammettbmch der Kolonialreiche {MGnchen, 1983 ), 396; unfortunately, I have been unable to find figures for the 
total number of French soldiers who served in Algeria). These arc dimensions to which only the Bocr \'V'ar compares. 
41 Conscript armies fought, for instnncc, for the UK in Malaya, for France in Algerin, for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan 
and of course for the United Stares in Vietnam. 
42 Ji.irgen Ostcrhammel/Nieis P. Petcrsson, Geschichte der Glohalisiemng: Dimensioueu- Pro::esse- Epochen (Miinchen, 
2003 ), 43-4; Jeremy Black (ed.), Dumont Atlas der \Veltgeschic!Jte (KOln, 2000), 76-7. That knowledge about a 
continent did not necessarily mean complcw exploration and mapping, especially of rhc interior, goes without saying. 
Until well into the nineteenth century, most of the interior of Africa south of the Sahara was blank on European maps, 
even though the coasts had been explored, mapped and mostly also occupied with bases several centuries before. 
experiences of nearly four centuries of 
dealing with, fighting, and subjugating 
"savages". Colonial powers could learn from 
their own experiences, and from those of 
other powers. For their indigenous 
opponents, the situation they faced when 
trying to resist conquest by Europeans was 
often unique in that they had never 
encountered it before. Where conquest 
succeeded immediately, their first chance to 
learn was also their last. Significantly, the 
indigenous political entities most capable of 
resisting European conquest for extended 
periods of time were those who had been in 
contact with Europeans before,43 whereas 
the ones rhat had been virtually isolated from 
the old world before the co1tquista- Central 
and South America- collapsed under rhe first 
onslaught. 
To a certain degree the colonized could 
compensate for their lack of knowledge 
about the wider world with an abundance of 
knowledge of local relevance. As Europeans 
often took it for granted that from Canada to 
the Sudan to Borneo one "savage" was just 
like another, they remained more or less 
ignorant of the significance of information on 
local polities, cultures, and traditions, a fact 
that frequently caused them to underestimate 
their adversaries, to miss opportunities, or to 
even risk outright disaster. Indigenous 
opponents also could generally capitalize on 
their superior knowledge of local geography 
which was as often as not sadly lacking on 
the side of their European adversaries. The 
history of colonial campaigning is full of 
reports of European armies setting our to 
conquer indigenous cities that turned our to 
be non-existent or hundreds of miles off the 
assumed location; of armies taking roads 
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leading into nowhere; of armies finding their 
way blocked by mountains or rivers that 
should not have been there according to maps 
they considered accurate, and armies which, 
as a result, were ambushed or annihilated or 
starved to death. This gap in locally relevant 
knowledge was one of the essential 
preconditions for the capability of indigenous 
populations to resist colonial conquest by 
means of small war campaigns.44 
This asymmetric distribution of 
knowledge- primarily global on the 
European, mainly local on the indigenous 
sicle- was most dramatic in the earliest stages 
of European expansion, most notably in the 
Americas, to a certain degree in nineteenth 
century sub-Saharan Africa and some remote 
areas. The development of colonial 
geography, ethnography, and some other 
sciences then contributed to closing the gap in 
local knowledge on the European side. In the 
early twentieth century, colonial powers 
generally knew infinitely more about local 
affairs than say in the seventeenth.45 At the 
same time, the globalization of the world, 
modern communications, and the emergence 
of Europeanized colonial elires helped to 
close the gap in global knowledge. In the 
wars of decolonization, national liberation 
movements usually led by intellectuals with 
European university degrees turned the tables 
on the former colonial powers. The 
Europeans now found that, while the modern 
world made global, general knowledge 
available to virtually everyone with the 
means to acquire a thorough formal 
education, knowledge of local affairs 
acquired by a colonial power remained, by 
nature, incomplete and outdated. As a 
consequence, in even the most recent wars in 
43 T. 0. Ranger, "'African Reactions to the lmposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa", in L. H. Gann/Petcr 
Duignan, Colonialism in A(rica 1870-1960, vol. 1, The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914 (Cambridge, 
1969), 304. 
44 Callwdl, Small \Vats, S. 43-56; Brian Bond (cd.), Victoriun Military Cmtfhligns, London 1967, 20-1. The most 
sp~:ctacular case of a European colonial army meeting disaster due to total lack of local knowledge is probably the 
Italian defeat at Adua: Giulia Brogini KU.nzi, "Dcr Sicg des Negus: Adua, 1. !vt:irz 1896 ", in Stig FOrstcr/~-larkus 
POhlmann/Dicrk Waiter (cds.), Scblachtcll dcr \Veltgcscbichte: Von Salamis InS Sinai, Jrd ed. (Miinchen, .2003), 248-63. 
45 David N. Livingstone, Tht• Geographical Tnzdition: Etn'sodes in the History of a Colltcsted Entaprise (Oxford, 1992), 
177-.259; Gearnid () Tuathail, CritictJ! Geopolitics: The Politics of \'Vriting GlobtJ/ Space (Minneapolis, MN, 1996); 
.Mor:~g Bell/Robin A. Budin/1v1ich:~e!J. Heffernan (eds.), Geogmphy mzd Imperialism, 1820-1940 (f..hnchesrer, 1995); 
Roben A. Stafford, "Scientific Exploration and Empire", in Porter/Low, Oxford History• of the British Empire, 3:294-
319. 
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the Third World, the indigenous side has still 
been able to capitalize on its advantage in 
local knowledge that has been essential for its 
capability to fight, and often win, its "small 
wars" .46 
Asymmetrv ~:!fActor Status 
The most striking asymmetry, bar none, in 
the relationship between a colonizing power 
and the indigenous political entities about to 
be colonized is of course the dramatic 
discrepancy in the international/legal status 
of the respective actors. For at least four and 
a half of the five centuries of European 
expansion it would be just a slight 
exaggeration to say that a non-European 
adversarv was at least legally in many a sense 
not an a~tor at all, but much rather a non-
entity. The strategies for legitimizing the 
marginalization of non-European actors have 
varied over time, but have always had a 
consistent common purpose in denying those 
actors both the ius ad bellum and the ius in 
bello entirely. From the earliest times right to 
the wars of decolonization, indigenous 
adversaries were, by definition, not 
belligerents. Instead, they were defined as 
pagans destined to be either Christianized or 
to suffer extermination (sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries); as unenlightened, 
uneducated, childish savages to be patronized 
and civilized, even against their will 
(eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); in 
Darwinian terms, as people less fit for 
survival and hence to be treated as mere 
obstacles in the way of the ever-expanding 
European civilization (late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries); and as late as the 
Cold War era, as insurgents resisting the 
legitimate rule of their internationally 
recognized colonial or post-colonial 
government. The international law system 
established in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries underpinned this asymmetric view 
of the world by reserving the rights of 
statehood to the established European and 
Europeanized powers, by and large; in this 
framework, whole continents with millions 
of inhabitants became a legal terra nullius, 
devoid of rightful owners and falling by 
default to any European power who first 
claimed possession by virtue of "effective 
occupation" .47 
In its dealings with political entities at the 
colonial periphery even the most 
inconsequential European power enjoyed all 
the advantages that were denied even to the 
most powerful non-European civilizations. 
Any European state was by definition a fully 
fledged political actor on the international 
stage, recognized by other powers, free to 
choose its own alliances, entitled to the full 
protection and all privileges of international 
law. To uphold their privileged position vis-
it-vis the non-European world, European 
powers even acted resolutely together, 
purring their internal rivalries aside, when 
their rights were threatened by non-European 
actors. In extreme cases, this culminated in 
joint intervention, which happened as late as 
the twentieth century in China.48 
The indigenous political entities, on the 
other hand, became, in the heyday of the 
colonial empires, prophylactically, and often 
without their knowledge, part of "spheres of 
influence" which gave usually a single 
European power exclusive rights to 
diplomatic and trade relations with them. 
They were thus legally and practically denied 
any freedom of action in foreign relations and 
became dependent actors in advance of any 
own decision to this effect.49 As a rule, in the 
interest of mutual protection of interests, 
colonial powers refrained from interfering 
with the affairs of the subjects of other 
colonial empires in peacetime. Around 1900, 
agreements ro this effect were even 
envisioned for wartime, thus neutralizing at 
46 Beckctt, Insurgencies, esp. 249; for an overview sec also Ronald Haycock (ed.), Regular Armies and Insurgencies, 
London 1979. 
47 IgnazScidi-Hohcnveldern, \'6/kerrecht, 5th eel. (KOln, 1984), 239; Aldo Virgilio L~mbardi, Biirgerkrieg und 
Vdlkerrecht: Die Anwendbarkeit J'cJ/kerrechtlichcr Norm en in lticht-zwischenstaat/lchen beuwffm•teu Konflikten 
(Berlin, 1976), 173-5. The most drastic example of the application of this theory is Australia: Andrew Markus, 
lwstmlian Race Relations 17!-}8-1993 (St. Leonards, NSW, 1994), 20-3. 
48 Susanne KuG/Bernd .i\hrtin (cJs.j, Dils Deutsche Reich und der Boxenm{stand {~Hinchen, 2002). 
least parrs of rhe colonial em~ires even in case 
of a general war in Europe. 5 l Again, the idea 
was to deny indigenous political entities legal 
actor status by preventing them from playing 
European powers off against one another. 
In the twentieth century some breaches in 
this formerly watertight system of differential 
international law emerged. For one thing, the 
international law status of European actors 
ceased to be completely sacrosanct. As 
theories of social Darwinism were 
increasingly applied to the European states 
system itself, the partitioning of colonies of 
some minor powers became at least 
thinkable, especially when these powers 
allegedly failed to perform convincingly 
enough in their colonizing and civilizing role. 
With regard to Portuguese Africa for 
instance, such treaties were negotiated 
already before World War One (but were not 
imple~ented).51 The Great War itself was 
fought in the colonies, in spite of prior 
agreements. By giving millions of non-
Europeans a chance to see Europeans fight 
one another, even enlisting coloured troops 
to shoot on fellow Europeans, it caused 
lasting damage to the illusion of universal 
European solidarity vis-a-uis non-European 
-, 
opponents.'-
The single most important factor that 
finally caused rhe demise of the differential 
international law system, however, was the 
ideology of anti-colonialism and the 
subsequent decolonization movement. Once 
"illegal" resistance movements could 
become, almost overnight, legitimate, 
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internationally recognized national 
governments while colonial powers forcibly 
resisting the independence of their colonies 
could severely damage their international 
credibility by doing so, the legal status gap 
between the actors began to shrink rapidly. 
The ideological confrontation of the Cold 
War that almost automatically guaranteed 
any resistance movement pictured as 
illegitimate by the one bloc complete 
international recognition by the other bloc 
added impetus to this deterioration of the old 
system. Still, the essential characteristics of 
the status gap have remained the same, and 
even in the colonial conflicts of the Cold War 
era, the fundamental asymmetry between the 
"strong" and the "weak", the state and the 
non-state actor, as suggested by Christopher 
Daase, still applies. 53 
A.1ymme/J)' of Ends 
Almost as dramatic as the consequences of 
asymmetry in the status of both actors in a 
colonial war are the discrepancies between 
the ends the war serves for the opposing 
sides. Obviously, war aims are always 
contradictory in nature; what one side gains, 
the other has to lose. But that is a superficial 
observation. Even in a "Total War" between 
great powers of the Northern hemisphere, the 
ends the war is fought for are contradictory, 
but of the same nature; one side seeks the 
overthrow of the other just as the other seeks 
one's own. The same is not at all true for 
wars of colonial domination. 
49 The pertinent case is, of course, the casual way in which the European powers a\•ailed themselves of the control of most 
of sourh-Saharan Africa in the Berlin Conference of 1884/5: Stig Fijrster/\Volfgang J. Mommsen/Ronald Robinson 
(eds.), Bisnwrck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 188-1-1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford, 
1988 ), csp. J6rg fisch, "Africa a!> terra nullius: The Berlin Conference and International Law", ibid., 34 7-75. For a 
convincing theoretical interpretation see .Johan Gal rung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism,.,, in ]oumal of Peace 
Research 8 (1971), 81-117, esp. 89-91. 
50 At le:tst this is what the Berlin Act provided for the area where it applied, i.e. most of Middle Africa. Fisch, "Africa", 
372-3. 
51 Rolf Peter Tschapek, Bausteinc eines ::.ukiin(tigen deutschen Mittela/rika: Deutscber Impcrialismus wzd die 
portugiesischen Ko/o1tien: Dcutsches luteresse an dw siidil{rikanischell Kolonien Portuga/s uom .msgehenden19. 
jahrlmndert bis zwn ersten \\lcltkrieg (Stuttgart, 2000), esp. 25-128; Sec also .Josr Diilffer~ "Vom europiiischcn 
M5chresysrcm zmn Weltstaatensystcm der .Jahrhundertwende", in Diilffer, Im Zeichen der Gewaft: Friedenund l\rieg 
im 19. zmd 20. jahrlmndert, ed.l'vlarrin KrOgcr!Ulrich 5. S01!nius/Stcfan Wunsch {KOln, 2003), 59. 
51 Sec for instance Frank Furedi, "The demobilized African soldier and the blow to white prestige", in Killingray/Omissi, 
GHardians o( EmjJire, J 79-97; Killingray, "Idea", 425-7; Tom Pocock, Fighting General: The Public and Prit•ate 
Campaigns of Geneml Sir W'alter Walker (London, 1973), 25. Also Schmidl, "Kolonialkriegc", 122-3. 
53 Daasc, Kleine Kriege. 
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The situation at the colonial periphery 
with respect to war aims is a simple 
consequence of the structure of the imperial 
system as such; in many ways, it is a result of 
geography only. By definition, colonial wars 
are fought at the periphery of the empire. 
They rake place in a remote area and involve 
either none or only a very indirect risk of 
affecting rhe metropolitan society at all. 
International prestige may be at stake, or in 
the worst case the supply of scarce raw 
materials- rh at is all there is to lose. 
Obviously, this does not mean that the centre 
of imperial power can not take a vested 
interest in colonial wars; if the stakes are high 
enough, governments can be toppled over 
colonial affairs. 54 Bur for the society in the 
mother country the war at the periphery is 
always fought for extremely limited aims. 
The opposite applies to the indigenous 
political entities against which colonials wars 
are waged. Unless those entities are empires 
so large and powerful in their own right that 
they can dismiss some strife on the frontier as 
just as insignificant as the colonial power 
itself- rh is applied for a long time to the 
Chinese, Mughal, and Ottoman Empires-, 
for the people about to be colonized colonial 
war is almost by definition a war for survival. 
lr is always fought on their own soil, and even 
if it does not culminate in cultural or actual 
physical genocide, the overthrow of at least 
the political, but equally often also the social 
and economic system is what the enemy 
strives for. From the perspective of the 
indigenous political entity, the war aims of 
the colonial power deserve in almost any case 
the label "total", while one's own war aims 
uis-a-vis that colonial power are entirely 
defensive in nature even locally; with respect 
to the remote metropolitan society, they are 
non-existent.55 
In the decolonization era things began to 
change. Wars were no longer necessarily 
fought to uphold formal colonial rule, but 
rather to ensure that the newly emerging 
nation states would be politically stable, 
socially conservative, and- under the 
auspices of the Cold War confrontation-
firmly planted in one_'s own ideological camp 
and alliance system.' 6 While every colonial 
war is in some way a civil war, as some social, 
political or ethnic groups are always on the 
side of the imperial power, in the wars of 
decolonization this aspect became dominant. 
This shift of emphasis tended to blur the 
asymmetry of the war aims of the opposing 
sides. However, in so far as these aims still 
referred to only one of the two societies 
involved, the one at the periphery, at its core 
the fundamental asymmetry of ends 
remained. 
A')'lllllle/1)' of Effort 
Closely related to the asymmetric ends in 
colonial wars are the asymmetric efforts the 
adversaries require to achieve those aims. As 
pointed out above, in keeping with their 
limited aims, the imperial power employs, 
wherever possible, only very limited means in 
any war at the colonial periphery. Needless to 
say, those means require by nature no 
unusual effort on the part of the metropolitan 
societv:57 "total mobilization" for a colonial 
war i~ a contradiction in tenns.58 
54 That was true especially (or France, Gt"rmany and the UK from the "'Scramblt" for Africa" to the First World \\?ar. 
55 \\ics$cllng, ,.,Colonials War~··, 3. 
56 A typical example for this set of conditions is Maby(si)a. Sec for instance John Coates, Supressing I11SurgenC)': An 
Analysis of the Malaymt Emergency, 19-18-1954 (Boulder, CO, 1992); A. J. Stockwell, "Insurgency and Dccolonisation 
During the Malayan Emergency", in journal of CommOitwca/t/; & Compariltiuc Politics 1511 ( 1987), 71-81; Richard 
Stuhbs, Hearts and Minds in Gttai/!.1 \Varfmc: The Malaya11 Emergency 1948-1960 (Singapore, 1989); Anthony Short, 
The Commtmist htsw-rection in Mal.1ya, 1948-1960 (London, 1 975). 
57 1-·Icrom, Democracies, 29, calls such conflicts ,under-invcsred wars", 
58 This is what makes the second Italian inv;1sion of Ethiopia such a strange and vexing episode in the history of colonial 
warfare. Ultimately, the attempt to launch a Europt"an-stylc total war against a decidedly pre~modern Third \\'orld 
country can only (and even then just barely) be understood \Vithin the context of Italian domestic and European foreign 
policy: as a carefully staged and propagandistically exploited rehearsal for a European war. See Giulia Brogini KUnzi, 
"Die Herrschaft der Gcdanken: ltalicnische :vWit5rzeitschrifu:n und das Bild des Krit·gcs", in Stig F6rster (ed.), An der 
Schu__,elfe zum Totale11 Krieg: Die militiiriscbe Debatte iiber de11 Krieg der Zukwt{t 1919-1939 (Jladt"rborn, 2002), 56; 
Brogini~Klinzi, Italieutmd der Abessinienkrieg 193.5/36: Ein Kolonialkrieg oder ein Totaler Krieg? (Diss. Bern, 2002}. 
The exact opposite is true, yet again, for 
political entities against which wars of 
colonial conquest are waged. Faced with a 
war for total aims, fought on their own soil 
and constantly brought home to them, they 
have to employ whatever means possible to 
ensure survival. Hence, the effort required 
from rhem is as "total" as it can be, and the 
whole of society is enlisted for the war. 
Admittedly, the indigenous parry in a war at 
the colonial periphery is as often as not a 
society with a decidedly pre-modern political 
organization and a very rudimentary division 
of labour, so that to speak of "total 
mobilization" is somewhat tautological. 
Nevertheless, the vast discrepancy in the 
effort required from both parries in most of 
these conflicts is striking. The non-European 
side is involved in colonial wars in a way the 
European side almost never is. 
Again, the picture changed significantly in 
the era of decolonization. As colonial wars 
began to be fought by mass armies of 
national servicemen, rhe metropolitan society 
was increasingly involved in the war effort-
Algeria and Vietnam are the best exam pies. 
Nevertheless. While modern democracies 
show a sharply declining tolerance of their 
own casualties in wars at the periphery,59 
thereby often creating an exaggerated image 
of the human cost of the war in the 
perception of the home society, 60 it is still 
true that the own effort in men and material 
is extremely limited compared with a war 
against a power of comparable military 
capacities. Likewise, the efforts required 
from the Third World adversary are still 
infinitely higher in comparison, and the 
consequences for irs society dramatically 
more senous. 
Symmetry of Ways 
Paradoxically, the fundamental asymmetry 
of means and ends in colonial wars as 
described above is the source of the striking 
symmetry in the ways in which they are often 
59 Sec 1\'lt:rom, Democrndcs, esp. 248-9. 
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fought. As with everv "small war", rhe non-
state or "weak" act,;r holds the power of 
definition. The "strong" or state actor- the 
imperial power in a colonial war- obviously 
prefers to fight his wars, even at the colonial 
periphery, in the conventional way that given 
his superior military means is most 
favourable for him: quick, decisive, offensive 
action, culminating in a series of pitched 
battles after which hopefully the indigenous 
opponent yields and accepts a peace 
settlement favourable to rhe imperial power-
limited war of limited duration, fought with 
limited means for limited ends. As stared 
above, if the indigenous adversary is obliging 
enough to comply with the rules of 
conventional warfare he forgoes most of the 
advantages he would hold in a small war 
campaign. And still, throughout the history 
of European expansion many a political 
entity at the colonial periphery has opted for 
conventional ways of waging war, has tried 
to fight a symmetric war in total disregard of 
the completely asymmetric means both sides 
had at their disposal. Especially those powers 
holding regional supremacy before the arrival 
of a European actor tried to deal with the 
new challenge in the old way, only to learn 
the hard way that at the end of the day even 
the highly developed military machinery of 
warrior kingdoms like the Zulu could nor 
cope with what any European power could 
field against rhem. Yet, as stated before, their 
first chance to learn was often also their last 
chance to apply the lesson. 
Those indigenous political entities who 
survived their attempt to resist the European 
onslaught in open battle, as well as those who 
realized their essential weakness in the first 
place, usually took to fighting guerrilla 
campaigns. By doing so, they turned rhe 
tables on rhe Europeans who in any war at 
the colonial periphery were stricken with a 
number of fundamental disadvantages which 
their indigenous adversaries could capitalize 
upon.61 
60 This is L'vldcnr, for instance, with respect to the United Scares and rhc present (2003-) guerrilb war in Iraq, just as for 
rhe earlier (1993) intervention in Somalia. 
61 Gann/Duignan, Rulers of British Africa, !39-43. 
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First and foremost, given the tiny 
'~armies" Europeans maintained in their 
colonies, their troops-to-space ratio was 
ridiculous. Once the enemy started a war of 
pinprick attacks against its lines of 
communication, no European colonial army 
could have any hope of securing those lines 
while at the same time maintaining a sizable 
field force. The enormous expanse of many 
colonial frontier areas where lines of 
communication could easily run several 
hundred miles through hostile country 
produced situations where upwards of 50 per 
cent of an army had to be used for rear area 
duties- except that in a hostile environment 
there was no "rear" .62 
By fighting a defensive guerrilla campaign, 
the indigenous opponent also made the most 
of his superior knowledge of the land, above 
all its geography. Especially where nature 
itself provided ample cover for small raiding 
parties- broken ground, jungle, wooded 
areas, mountains, swamps, in other words 
almost everything except wide open plains-
a tiny European colonial army had no means 
whatsoever of effectively suppressing a small 
war campaign. In fact, it had to consider itself 
lucky if it was not outright ambushed 
wherever it moved. Finally, with a small war 
campaign the indigenous adversary created 
an environment that was hostile throughout. 
Often, in the European perception, 
geography, nature, and local population 
merged into one combined challenge they 
had little hope of coping with- at least not by 
conventional means- and that constantly 
undermined their credibility both as a 
62 Callwell, Small Wars, 115-8. 
superior military power and as legitimate 
ruler of the country. 63 
It took the great powers of the Northern 
hemisphere some time to find a 
counterstrategy for local small wars waged 
against their colonial armies, and some never 
learned - as late as the 1960s, the United 
States tried to fight a primarily conventional 
war at the colonial periphery; the Soviet 
Union repeated that mistake even in the 
1980s. The answer, of course, was to copy 
the ways of the indigenous opponent and 
turn them against themselves. Increasingly in 
the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, 
European colonial armies abandoned the 
conventional ways of waging war and 
learned to fight small wars.64 If the enemv 
raided their own communications and thus 
tried to deny them means of keeping their 
forces in the field supplied, the answer was to 
destroy the means of his very subsistence and 
thus keep him from fighting at all. If the 
enemy used the local population for support 
and cover, the answer was to carry the war to 
this population, teach them that by 
supporting the enemy and resisting the 
imperial power they put their very survival at 
risk. If the enemy offered no target for a 
conventional military campaign- no army, 
no fortress, no capital city to be conquered-
the answer was to _make the entire country a 
legitimate target. 60 Hence, colonial 
campaigning increasingly ceased to have any 
similarity with European-style warfare; 
instead, it took the shape of cattle lifting and 
crop burning raids- in the best case- and of 
punitive expeditions against the population 
of entire areas - in the worst. 66 
63 Sec for Vietnam Bernd Greincr, "'First to Go, Last to Know': Der Dschungdkrieger in Vietnam", in Gcschichtc tmd 
Gesellscha(t 29 (2003 ), 251-4. The perception of the environment described here is representative of the entire history 
of European colonial campaigning. See also Bond, Campaigns, 11-1. It is, therefore, no coincidence that repeatedly 
fighting the hostile environment and fighting the enemy became indisringuislwble in the minds of the Europeans at the 
colonial periphery, culminatillg for instance in Kenya (Frank Kirson, Bunch of Fil'c {London, 1977) 54-5) and, more 
well~known, in Viemam, in large scale deforestation or defoliation. See also Susanne KuiS, "'Kriegfiihrung ohne 
hemmendc Kulrurschranke: Die dcutschcn Kolonialkricge in Sildwcstafrika {1904-07) und Ostafrika {"1905--08)" 
(unpublished paper, presented tO the conference "Kolonialkricge" (colonial wars), Erfurc (Germany), 10 to 11 January 
2003). For the exaggerated ideas that the British had of the "natural advantages" their Maori adversaries supposedly 
enjoyed in their natural domestic environment, sec Belich, lnterpret.1tion, 315. Needless to mention that these theories 
came in very handy in explaining rhe reasons for a defeat. 
64 Vander\'Ort, \~'ars, 209-12; Bcckcn, Insurgencies, 30-51. 
65 On the rheorr see Callwell, Small \Vars, esp. 34-42, 145-9;Jarnes, Sal'age \Vars, 183-4. 
66 For some typical examples sec again lonsdale, "Conquest State". 
As stated earlier, the indigenous opponent 
in a colonial war had never, nor even on 
paper, enjoyed the rights of ius ad bel!um and 
ius in bello, 67 but with small war becoming 
the means of choice for colonial campaigns 
all rules were abandoned.68 The hostile 
population was increasingly viewed as being 
on the same level as any other element of the 
hostile natural environment- together with 
swamps, jungles, wild beasts and the tsetse 
fly, the "savage" became an annoying feature 
of colonial geo~raphy that was earmarked 
for extinction.6 That did not regularly mean 
genocide70 - but accidental killings, even 
massacres, were perfectly legitimate and not 
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worth a second thought.71 Large-scale 
removal of populations from entire areas 
became a means not only of convenient 
appropriation of land but also of 
pacification. 72 Scruples about employing 
such practices had never been very 
pronounced in the history of European 
expansion, but with small war campaigns 
being waged against the colonial rulers, these 
practices acquired a new, more pressing 
justification- not as means of "developing" 
a colony, but as instrument to ensure the very 
survival of the colonial system and its 
European protagonists on the spot. 
67 The recurrent claim that colonial wars were, by definition, exempted from the rules of the Hague convention, or of any 
international law of war whatsoever, appears to have no firm legal foundation in the Convemion itself or in 
international law. That rules of war and the Hague convention had very little actual significance for colonial \Varfare 
was probably more a consequence of the fact that non-Europcan states were, with only a few cxeptions, not recognized 
by European powers and therefore not invited to sign the Convention. 
68 A typical example is the behaviour of the Aml·rican troops in the Philippines from late 1899 (Frank Schumachcr, 
'"Nicderbrcnncn, Plilndern und A·lorden so lit Ibr .. .': Dcr Kolonialkrieg dcr USA auf den Philippinen, 1898-1902". 
Unpublished paper, presented to the conference "Kulonialkriege", Erfurt 2003) and of course of the German 
Schutztmppe in South*West*Africa in 190415 (lsabcl V. Hull, "'Military Culture and the Production of 'Final Solutions' 
in rhe Colonies: The Example of Wilhdminian Germany", in Robert Gellately/Hen Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of 
Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspecth'L' (Cambridge, 2003 ), 152-4 }. Cf. Schmidl, "Kolonialkriegc", 117-9. 
69 Representative also for earlier periods and other frontiers is the comparatively late quote from Kitson, Bunch of f'irre, 
13-4, with respect to the Ivlau Mau insurgency in Kenya:" ~·lost of them !the British soldiers] saw e\·idence of revolting 
Mau Mau brutality from time m time, and probably regarded the finding and desposing of the gang members in the 
same 'vay as they would regard the hunting nf a dangerous wild animal." Europeans saw the apparemely natural 
guerrilla war competence- bushcraft, if you will- of their indigenous adversaries as evidence of their intimate 
relationship with nature itself. Equating the "savage"' to wild animals was then onlr a small step away and resulted in a 
drustically reduced inhibition level against decidedly bruml ways of warfare. Cf. Belich, Interpretation, 329-30. 
70 for ;tn intelligent, but ultimately politically motivated contribution to the recently much debated question of colonial 
genocide sec El azar Barkan, "Genocides of Indigenous Peoples: Rhetoric of Human Rights", in Gcllatcly/Kiernan, 
Specter a( Genocide, 117-39. For Barkan, <lll explicit imcntion on parr of the alleged perpetratOr, together with the 
large*scale disappearance of an indigenous population, is sufficient to constitute genocide (136), which is tantamount to 
claiming that a motive and a dead body would suffice for a com•icrion for murder, even in complete absence of actual 
proof of the deed. Ultimately, Harkan does nor deny that the intentio11al cxterminntion of indigenous populations was a 
very rare exception in the history of European expansion. An interesting discussion of this problem can be found in 
Jilrgen Zimmercr, "Kolonialer Genozid? Vom Nut-zen und Nachteil einer historischen Kategorie filr eine 
GIQbalgeschichte des Vhlkcrmordes", in Dominik J. Schaller/Boyadjian Rupen/Hanno ScholuJVivianne Berg (eds.), 
Entcignet- Vt:rtrieben- Ermordet. Bcitn1ge zur Gcnozidforsdmng {ZUrich, 2004), 109-28. Sec also Zimmercr, 
"Holocaust und Kolonialismus: Beitrag zu eincr Archiiologie de-S gcnozidalen Gcdankcns", in: ZeitsdJrift (iir 
Geschicl!tswisscnscha{t 51 (2003 ), 1098-119, and Zimmerer, ''Die Gcburt des 'Ostlandes' a us dem Geiste des 
Kolonialismus: Die nationalsozialistische Erobcrungs· und Heherrschungspolitik in (posr*)b)]onialer Perspektive", in 
Sozia/Gcschichtc 19 (2004), 10-43. 
71 See for Australia Hroomc, Aborigilw/ Austwlimrs, csp. 39-44. Cf. Hull, ".Military Culrure", 142-3. 
72 \X'ell*known instances of sw.re*initiated land robbery on rhe grand scale arc the expulsion of the :Vlasai from the 
Laikipia Plateau of Kenya (?vi. P. K. Sorrcnson, "Lmd Policy in Kenya 1895-1945"', in Vincent Harlow/E. M. Chilver/ 
Alison Smith (eds.), History of East A(ric<t, \'Dl. 2 (Oxford, 1965), 683-4) and the Jack son administration's lndimr 
Remoml Act (1830; sec Rein hard, Expmrsion, vol. 2, Die nerw Welt (Stuttgart, 1985), 217-8). The latter was, with 
respect to the "Five Civilized Nations", without doubt a classical "final solution" just short of actual genocide (see 
Hull, "Military Culture", 143). In the wars of the dccolonization era, planned n:senlemem, aimed at facilitating 
permanent control of the population and severing their COiltacts with the insurgents, was a mainstay of many 
counterinsurgency campaigns, so for instance in Malaya, Algeria and Indochina (strategic hamlet programme). Of 
comse internal security, nor land appropriation, was the primary motive behind these latter instances of forced 
migration {especially keeping in mind the Jccolonization comcxt)- another example of how long established 
instruments of imperial expansion and domination were partly transformed (but remained very much recognizable) in 
the twentieth century. 
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Accordingly, protracted small war 
campaigns on the colonial frontier became a 
regular feature of upholding European rule in 
the colonial empires. Both sides had taken to 
fighting their asymmetric wars as small wars 
- hence they fought, again, in a symmetric 
way. Many such wars were smouldering for 
decades, time and again erupting into more 
intensive phases with attacks on European 
farms or installations and the resulting 
punitive expeditions. Small wars of varying 
intensity were what accounted for the bulk of 
the continuous violence in colonial frontier 
areas. 
Again, the second half of the twentieth 
century added a new quality. Nation-wide, 
trans-ethnic resistance and liberation 
movements emerged in many colonies. Public 
opinion in the First World, but also in other 
Third World countries began to take an 
interest in colonial affairs. The ideological 
confrontation of the Cold War as well as the 
decolonization movement provided effective 
international background forces?3 As a 
consequence of all these factors, the political 
dimension of colonial wars acquired primary 
importance. Colonial wars were no longer 
fought for military domination only, but 
increasingly for supremacy in the headlines as 
well. Europe's great powers began to realize 
that the colonies could neither be held nor 
even be "de-colonized" as desired merely by 
state terror, by coercing hostile populations 
into submission. Accordingly, the new 
emphasis was on "winning the hearts and 
minds". Military means became subordinate 
to political ones in a way that was without 
precedent in the history of European 
expansion. The colonial soldier became 
administrator, civil engineer, development 
worker. Colonial small war campaigning was 
transformed into its modern form, 
counterinsurgency - an integrated approach 
to Third World crises of which the purely 
military response was only one element 
among many?4 
Yet the decolonization era has also 
brought about a regressive tendency in the 
ways wars at the colonial periphery were 
waged. As indigenous liberation movements 
aspired to statehood, they increasingly aimed 
at proving their legitimacy by 
demonstratively acquiring the characteristics 
of traditional state actors. Above all that 
meant turning to conventional warfare based 
on regular field armies?5 The development 
of colonial campaigning had come full circle. 
In fact, sometimes it went beyond that-
paradoxically, in some cases the non-
European actor now fielded conventional 
forces and the European power countered by 
employing special forces fighting a 
counterinsurgency campaign. 76 
Conclusion 
I am aware that the asyrnmetries and 
symmetries discussed in this article may 
occasionally have created the impression of 
clear-cut lines between different phenomena, 
and of linear developments over time. Yet 
this deceptive clarity is simply due to lack of 
space and with a view to the higher purpose 
of generalization. The thoughts presented 
here are a very sun1mary overview over five 
centuries, five continents, and almost a dozen 
colonial powers; they aim to describe general 
trends, not to do justice to individual cases. 
To construct a general model of successive 
73 Frank Furedi, "Creating a Breathing Space: The Political !vlanagcment Of Colonial Emergencies", in journal of 
Imperial and Conmwnwc.dth History 21 ( 1993), 90-3; Wolfgang J. Mommsen (ed.), Das En de der Kolonidlrcicl}l:: 
Dekohmis.aionzmd die Politik dcr GroPm•'ichte (Frankfurt!Main, 1990); Mommscn, "'End of Empire". 
74 Roger Trinquicr, L1 guem.! nwdernc {Paris, 1961 ); Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist lmurgenc)': E.•perie11ces 
from .Mala}'a .md Vietnam (London, I 966 ); Thomas R. Mockairis, "The Origins of British Counter-Insurgency", in 
Small \Vars c"- Insurgencit•s 1 ( 1990), 209-25; Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgem:y, 1919-60 (Basingsroke, 1990); Tim 
Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SA.S 1945-1952: A Special Type of \f/i.1r{are (London, 2001 ), esp. 1-18, 
138-46. 
75 Daase, Kleiue Kriege, S. 216-34. 
76 So for instance in the so~called Confrontation, the border conflict waged by Indonesia against Malaysia 1963-6, when 
regular Indonesian army units faced British special forces. Michad Dcwar, Brush Fire \V,Jrs: Minor Campaigns of the 
British army since 1945 (London, 198411987), 99-112; Tony Gcraghry, Who Dares \\1ius: The Story of the SAS 1950-
1982 (Glasgow, 1981 ), 65-77. 
phases equally applicable to all individual 
cases, let alone ro the entire hisrory of 
European expansion, would be a hopeless 
and futile endeavour. Similar developments 
occurred on different continents at different 
times. For instance, the North American 
Indians (bur not those in Central America) 
employed the means of guerrilla warfare 
from the moment of their first confrontation 
with European adversaries, while centuries 
later in Africa the Zulu met the British in 
pitched battles in the open?7 
Learning from the experiences made in 
colonial wars, and thus by implication the 
transformation of colonial warfare as such, is 
not even a linear development within the 
same colonial empire. On the contrary, 
learning is always connected to specific 
regions and actOrs. Whatever earlier 
protagonists of an imperial power may 
already have known about fighting their 
indigenous adversaries, other protagonists of 
the same power on another continent will 
have clean forgotten already decades, but 
certainly centuries later. And besides, 
learning is not always as easy as it seems. 
Even in the age of telecommunication, the 
Americans in Vietnam did not manage ro 
draw useful conclusions from the experience 
their allies, the British, had made only very 
few years earlier in their successful 
counterinsurgency in Malaya.78 In this light, 
the sheer impossibility and in any case the 
rather questionable usefulness of global 
development models for colonial warfare 
becomes obvious. 
The tendency to fight a war the 
conventional way is strong on both sides, but 
on the European side it is almost irresistible. 
The temptation to end with a single massive 
stroke what the other side fights deliberately 
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as a protracted war of attrition 79 can be 
overwhelming.80 Thus the option of fighting 
colonial wars in the style of the European 
great power war was not only theoretically 
available throughout the hisrory of European 
expansion, but was frequently made use of. 
That is another reason why no single, 
overarching model of phases will ever be able 
to cover the entire five centuries of warfare at 
the colonial periphery. 
To go even further, a general model would 
not even make sense for individual cases or 
categories of cases. Of course there were 
many colonial wars that followed quite 
closely the classical pattern described above: 
they started with a phase of pitched battles in 
the open and then moved on to a second 
phase dominated by guerrilla war, eirher 
after a crushing defeat of the indigenous side, 
or even without that. But on the other hand 
there always were cases where colonial wars 
were conducted as small wars from the 
outset, not the least because (as mentioned 
above) at the colonial periphery the 
distinction between war and peace was very 
definitely blurred. Such wars could continue 
as guerrilla wars for their entire duration, or 
they could pass through phases of open, 
conventional warfare, even culminate in 
such. That, again, rules out any general phase 
model for individual wars, although it may 
be worthwhile to think about several 
different, complementary models that 
describe, in a set of ideal types, the conditions 
for the various actual courses colonial wars 
could take. 
So much for the caveats. All that, 
however, is not meant to imply that 
ultimately each and every colonial war is a 
special case in its own right, and any 
abstraction, any sort of general statement 
77 For North America sec Douglas Edward Leach, Arms (or Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in l\'orth 
America, 1607-1763 {New York, ·1973 ); Robcrt M. Udey, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the 
Indimz 1848-1865 (New York, 1967); Ut!cy, Frontier Regulars: The Uuited St11tt!S Army and the Indian 1866-1891 
(Lincoln, NE, 1973); on the Zulu sec !an Knight, The Anatomy of the Zulu Army from Shaka to Cetshwayo 1818-
1879 {London, 1995). 
78 Sec for instance Stcvcn Head, "The Other War: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam", in James S. Olson (ed.), The Vietnam 
War: Handbook of the Literature ,md Research {Wcstport, CT, 1993 ), 125-43. 
79 Mao Tsc-tung, "0bcr den langwierigen Kricg (Mai 1938)", in Mao, A.usgewiihfte Werke, ed. Kommission des 
Zemralkomitces dcr Kommunistischen Partci Chinas fUr die Herausgabc der Ausgcwiihltcn Werkc Mao Tse-rungs, vol. 
2, Die Periode des \Vidersti.mdskriegs gegen die japauische Aggressioll {Peking, 1968}, 127-228. 
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about the nature of colonial war is futile 
(and, thus, ultimately, this article quite 
superfluous). On the contrary: I maintain 
that there are some key characteristics that 
most colonial wars have in common; I believe 
that these characteristics can be usefully 
analyzed in terms of symmetry and 
asymmetry; and I submit that analyzing them 
is crucial for a better understanding of the 
development of warfare in our time. 
In order to further such understanding, I 
believe, we must take great care to avoid two 
fundamental misunderstandings. One is a 
simple, popular, and old one, namely that the 
term "war" rightfully only signifies the 
Clausewitzian, symmetric war of state actors, 
and any other form of political violence is an 
aberration of sorts. 
The other misunderstanding is newer, 
more complex, and just about to gain 
popularity, but in the debate among 
historians and sociologists it has already 
become commonplace. That 
misunderstanding is the notion that striving 
for symmetric, regulated wars was 
admittedly an exception in world history in 
that it was limited to the core states of the 
Western world and the eighteenth to 
twentieth centuries, but in rh is phase, so this 
thesis insists- in a formative phase for our 
collective memory -symmetric, interstate 
war was the dominant reality. 
This second misunderstanding, being 
more subtle and- as an antithesis to the first 
one- by default more credible, may be the 
most serious obstacle for a better 
understanding of the development of warfare 
in modern times. War characterized by a 
large number of asymmetric elements has 
never been confined to some archaic age prior 
to the Peace of Westphalia- which seems to 
be the bottom-line of some recent debates 
that focus on the "return" to the stage of 
early modern or even medieval forms of 
conflict in the shape of "new wars" or the 
"war of the future". 81 In actual fact, war 
characterized by a large number of 
asymmetric elements has never disappeared 
from world history, not for a single day. The 
same powers that in Europe fought 
symmetric, interstate wars - or at least 
professed to adhere to the noble principle of 
symmetry- at the same time ruthlessly 
capitalized on their massive superiority over 
their indigenous adversaries in small, 
asymmetric, "dirty" wars on the colonial 
periphery.82 Wars characterized primarily by 
asymmetries therefore never ceased to be the 
dominant manifestation, the primary reality 
of collective application of force. This is true 
even for most core states of the Northern 
Hemisphere in the eighteenth through 
twentieth centuries, with the exception 
maybe of those that had no overseas 
possessions- but these happy few were 
usually at the same time those that hardlv 
fought any wars anyway, or they had at l~ast 
some sort of colonial frontier, like Austria-
Hungary on the Balkans. 
It is, therefore, my considered opinion that 
in order to understand warfare in history we 
must in the first place understand that form 
of war that is primarily characterized by 
asymmetries. Sym1netric wars, 
Clausewitzian, state-actor wars, are a unique 
exception, idealized, heavily regulated and 
somewhat unreal models of warfare which 
could even be understood as deviations from 
what Clausewitz himself identified as the true 
nature of war. Tbe early modern ideal of 
symmetric war has heavily influenced our-
the twentieth century Europeans' - thinking 
on war (probably more tban our actual 
conduct of war). The dominant historical 
reality of warfare, however, is war in which 
the actual asymmetries determine the course 
81 This debate reached its peak in 200112 but has since receded. Mary Kaldor, '"'Gcgcn wen? Gcwalr im Zciraltcr dcr 
Globalisicrung: Die ,ncucn Kricgc"' lasscn sich nichr militilrisch gcwinncn ", in Frankfurter Allgcmeim: (14 September 
200 1), 52; 1-Ierfricd Miinklcr, Ober den Krieg: Station m der Kricgsgeschichtc im Spiegel ibrer theoretischen Reflcxion 
(GOttingcn, 2002), I 99-264; Miinkler, Die 111!111!11 Kriege; RUdigcr Voigt (cd.), Krieg- lnstmment der Pofitik? 
lkwa{fnete Kon{likte mu Oberga11g vom 20. zttm 21. j.Ihrlumdert (Baden-Baden, 2001); Chrlstopher Daase, , .. Dcr 
Kricg isr ein Chamiilcon': Zum Formcnwandcl polirischcr Gcwalt im 21. Jahrhundcrt"', in Forum Locwm 21/4 (2002), 
6-11; tvlanin Hoch, "Die Riickkchr des Mittdalrers in der Sichcrhcirspolitik", in W1eltTre11ds 35 (2002), 17-34. 
82 So correctly Hcrbcrg-Rothc, Krieg, 20. 
and conduct of the conflict, and this war, I 
submit, is the war that we must try to 
understand. 
To do that, however, there is no better 
way than studying the history of colonial 
wars. Colonial war is the archetypical 
example of asymmetric war. No war in the 
core of the Western world, not even between 
a great power and a dwarf state, could ever 
be remotely as asymmetric as almost any war 
on the colonial periphery turned our to be. 
The nature of the imperial relationship on the 
one hand and of the European power system 
and the Europe-centered world system on the 
other hand made sure that the former war -
the one between European states - remained 
essentially symmetric even in spite of a 
massively asymmetric ratio of military 
potentia is, and that the latter -the colonial 
war- was kept asymmetric even under most 
favourable circumstances. In other words: if 
there is a phenomenon that can usefully be 
described in terms of its asymmetries it is, 
before all else, the colonial war. 
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